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Abstract
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We present a general model on the simulation of the measurement-device independent quantum
key distribution (MDI-QKD). It can be used to predict experimental observations of a MDI-QKD
with linear channel loss, simulating corresponding values for the gains, the error rates in different
basis, and also the final key rates. Our model can be applicable to the MDI-QKDs with whatever
convex source states or using whatever coding schemes. Therefore, it is useful in characterizing
and evaluating the performance of any MDI-QKD protocols, making it a valuable tool in studying
the quantum key distributions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a long history between the attacks and the anti-attacks in the development
of quantum key distributions (QKD) since the idea of BB84 (Bennett-Brassard 1984 [1, 2])
protocol was put forward, due to the conflictions between the ”in-principle” unconditional
security and realistic implementations. Till today, there have been many different proposals
for the secure QKD with realistic setups, such as the decoy-state method [3–14] which can
rescue the QKD with imperfect single-photon sources [15, 16], while the device-independent
quantum key distribution [17, 18] and the recently proposed measurement-device indepen-
dent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) [19, 20] can further relieve the QKD even when
the detectors are controlled by the eavesdropper [21]. Most interestingly, the MDI-QKD is
not only immune to any detector attacks, but also able to generate a significant key rate
with existing technologies. Moreover, its security can still be maintained with imperfect
single-photon sources [19, 22–27], and the effects of coding errors have also been studied
[23, 28].
In developing practical QKDs, one important question is how to evaluate the performance
of a proposal before really implementing it, since it is not realistic to experimentally test
everything. Therefore, it is crucially important to make a thorough theoretical study and
numerical simulation to predict the experimental results. In principle, it allows to use
different kinds of sources in a decoy state MDI-QKD [22, 23]. Before experimentally testing
all of them, one can choose to give a theoretical comparison with a reasonable model.
In traditional decoy state methods [4–6], the models for calculation are relatively simple.
However, for MDI-QKDs, it is not a simple job except for the special case of using weak
coherent states. So far, there have been proposals with different sources, e.g., the heralded
single-photon source (HSPS) etc [8, 9, 22]. And it has been shown that such a source can
promise a longer secure distance than the weak coherent state. Nevertheless, it is unknown
whether there are other sources which can present even better performance. Therefore,
a general model on simulating the performance of arbitrary source states will be highly
desirable. Here in this manuscript we solve the problem.
For simplicity, we assume a linear lossy channel in our model. Note that the security does
not depend on the condition of linear loss at all. We only use this model to predict: what
values the gains and error rates would possibly be observed if one did the experiment in the
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FIG. 1: (Color online) A schematic of the experimental setup for the collective measurements at
the UTP. BS: beam-splitter; PBS: polarization beam-splitter; D1 - D4: single-photon detector; 1,
2: input port for photons.
normal case when there is no eavesdropper. Given these values, one can then calculate the
low bound of the yield and the upper bound of the phase flip-error rates for single-photon
pairs. The major goal here is to simulate the values of gains and error rates of different
states in normal situations. Of course, they can be replaced with the observed values in real
implementations.
The paper is arranged as follows: In Sec. II we present the general model for the gains
and error rates in a MDI-QKD, describing the detailed calculation processes. In Sec. III
we proceed corresponding numerical simulations, comparing the different behaviors of MDI-
QKDs when using different source states. Finally, discussions and summaries are given out
in Sec. IV.
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II. THE GENERAL MODEL ON MDI-QKD
A. Setups and definitions
Consider the schematic setup in Fig. 1 [19], there are three parties, the users-Alice and
Bob, and the un-trusted third party (UTP)-Charlie. Alice and Bob send their polarized
photon pulses to the UTP who will take collective measurement on the pulse-pairs. The col-
lective measurement results at the UTP determine the successful events. They are two-fold
click of detectors (1,4), (2,3), (1,2) or (3,4). The gain of any (two-pulse) source is determined
by the number of successful events from the source. There are 4 detectors at the UTP, we
assume each of them has the same dark count rate d, and the same detection efficiency ξ.
In such a case, we can simplify our model by attributing the limited detection efficiency to
the channel loss. Say, if the actual channel transmittance from Alice to Charlie is η1, we
shall assume perfect detection efficiency for Charlie’s detectors with channel transmittance
of η1ξ. Each detector will detect one of the 4 different modes, say a
†
H , a
†
V , b
†
H , b
†
V in creation
operator. For simplicity, we denote them by c†i , i.e., c
†
1 = a
†
H , c
†
2 = a
†
V , c
†
3 = b
†
H , c
†
4 = b
†
V . In
such a way, detector Di corresponds to mode i exactly. To calculate the gains that would-be
observed for different source states in the linear lossy channel, we need to model the prob-
abilities of different successful events conditional on different states. Let’s first postulate
some definitions before further study.
Definition 1: event (i, j). We define event (i, j) as the event that both detector i and
detector j click while other detectors do not click. Obviously, each i, j must be from numbers
{1, 2, 3, 4} and i 6= j . For simplicity, we request i < j throughout this paper.
Definition 2: Output states and conditional probabilities of each events: notations ρout:
the output state of the beam-splitter. |li, lj〉 = |lilj〉: the beam-splitter’s specific output state
of li photon in mode i, lj photon in mode j, and no photon in any other mode. Explicitly,
|lilj〉 = 1√
li!lj !
c†i
li
c†j
lj |0〉. P (ij|li, lj) and P (ij|ρout): the probability that event (i, j) happens
conditional on that the beam-splitter’s output state is |lilj〉 and ρout, respectively. Hereafter,
we omit the comma between li and lj, i.e., we use |lilj〉 for |li, lj〉, and P (ij|lilj) for P (ij|li, lj).
Definition 3: Events’ probability conditional on the beam-splitter’s input state:
pαβij (k1, k2) = p
αβ
ij (k1k2). We denote p
αβ
ij (k1, k2) as the probability of event (i, j) conditional
on that there are k1 photons of polarization α for mode a and k2 photons of polarization β
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for mode b as the input state of the beam-splitter. Hereafter, we omit the comma between k1
and k2. α or β indicate the photon polarization. Explicitly, α or β can be H, V,+,− for po-
larizations of horizontal, vertical, pi/4 and 3pi/4, respectively. To indicate the corresponding
polarization state, we simply put each of these symbols inside a ket.
Definition 4: Events’ probability conditional on the two-pulse state of Alice and Bob’s
source: qαβij (ρA ⊗ ρB). It is the probability that event (i, j) happens conditional on that
Alice sends out photon-number state ρA with polarization α and Bob sends out photon
number state ρB with polarization β. Sometimes we simply use q
α,β
ij for simplicity.
B. Elementary formulas and outline for the model
Given the definitions above, we now formulate various conditional probabilities. We start
with the probability of event (i, j) conditional on the output state |lilj〉.
P (ij|lilj) =


(1− d)2, if li > 0, lj > 0
d(1− d)2, if li · lj = 0 and li + lj > 0
d2(1− d)2, if li = lj = 0
(1)
Here the detection efficiency does not appear because we put shall this into the channel loss
and hence we assume perfect detection efficiency. The factor (1 − d)2 comes from the fact
that we request detectors other than i, j not to click. Also, the probability for event (i, j) is
0 if any mode other than i, j is not vacuum. Given these, we can now calculate probability
distribution of the various two fold events given arbitrary input states of the beam-splitter.
Therefore, for any output state of the beam-splitter ρout, the probability that event (i, j)
happens is
P (ij|ρout) =
∑
li,lj
P (ij|lilj)〈lili|ρout|lilj〉 (2)
Based on this important formula, we can calculate the probability of event (i, j) for any
input state by this formula. For the purpose, we only need to formulate ρout. Therefore,
given the source state of the two pulses ρA ⊗ ρB, we can use the following procedure to
calculate the probability of event (i, j), pij(ρA ⊗ ρB):
i) Using the linear channel loss model to calculate the two-pulse state when arriving at the
beam-splitter. Explicitly, if the channel transmittance is η, any state |n〉〈n| is changed into
|n〉〈n| −→
∑
Cknη
k(1− η)n−k|k〉〈k|. (3)
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ii) Using the transformation: a†H,V −→ 1√2(a
†
H,V + b
†
H,V ; b
†
H,V =
1√
2
(a†H,V − b†H,V ) to calculate
the output state of the beam-splitter, ρout.
iii) Using Eq.(2) to calculate the probability of event (i, j). According to the protocol, we
shall only be interested in the probabilities of successful events, (1, 2), (3, 4), (1, 4) and (2, 3).
Below we will describe the detailed calculation processes in Z basis and X basis individually.
In Z basis, all successful events correspond to correct bit values when Alice and Bob send
out orthogonal polarizations, and they correspond to wrong bit values when Alice and Bob
send out the same polarizations. The observed gain in Z basis for photon-number state
ρA ⊗ ρB is,
SZρA⊗ρB =
1
4
∑
(i,j)∈Suc
[
qHVij (ρA ⊗ ρB) + qV Hij (ρA ⊗ ρB) + qHHij (ρA ⊗ ρB) + qV Vij (ρA ⊗ ρB)
]
(4)
and the set Suc = {(1, 2), (3, 4), (1, 4), (2, 3)}. Here, as defined in Definition 4, qαβij (ρA⊗ ρB)
represents the probability of event (i, j) whenever Alice sends her photon number state
ρA with polarization α and Bob sends his photon number state ρB with polarization β.
For simplicity, we shall omit ρA ⊗ ρB in brackets or in subscripts if there is no confusion.
Meantime, the successful events caused by the same polarizations will be counted as wrong
bits. These will contribute to the bit-flip rate by:
E˜Z =
∑
(i,j)∈Suc
[
qHHij + q
V V
ij
]
4SZ
(5)
In X basis, we should be careful that the situation is different from in Z basis, since
now the successful events correspond to correct bits include two parts: 1) Alice and Bob
send out the same polarizations (++ or −−), and Charlie detects Φ+ ((1,2) or (3,4) events
happen); 2) Alice and Bob send out orthogonal polarizations (+− or −+), and Charlie
detects Ψ− ((1,4) or (2,3) events happen). And the left successful events belong to wrong
bits. Therefore, we have
SX =
1
4
∑
(i,j)∈Suc
[
q+−ij + q
−+
ij + q
++
ij + q
−−
ij
]
(6)
and
E˜X =
∑
(i,j)∈(14),(23)
[
q++ij + q
−−
ij
]
+
∑
(i,j)∈(12),(34)
[
q+−ij + q
−+
ij
]
4SX
(7)
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Moreover, there are alignment errors which will cause a fraction (Ed) of states to be
flipped. We then modify the error rate in different bases by
EZ = Ed · (1− 2E˜Z) + E˜Z (8)
and
EX = Ed · (1− 2E˜X) + E˜X (9)
Note that in the above two formulas above, we have considered this fact: before taking the
alignment error into consideration, the successful events can be classified into two classes: one
class has no error and the other class has an error rate of 50%, they are totally random bits.
The second class takes a fraction of 2EZ (or 2EX) among all successful events. Alignment
error does not change the error rate of the second class of events, since they are random bits
only.
Given these, we can simulate the final key rate. In a model of numerical simulation, our
goal is to deduce the probably would-be value for SZ , SX and EZ , EX in experiments. Given
these, one can then calculate the yield of the single-photon pairs, s11, the bit-flip rates in Z
basis and X basis, and hence the final key rate. Now everything is reduced to calculate all
pαβij above.
C. Conditional probabilities for beam-splitter’s incident state of k1 photons in
mode a and k2 photons in mode b
We consider the case that there are k1 incident photons in mode a and k2 incident
photons in mode b of the beam-splitter. Each incident pulse of the beam-splitter has its own
polarization and is indicated by a subscript. In general, we consider the state
|k1〉α|k2〉β (10)
We shall consider the conditional probabilities for various successful events, i.e. pαβij (k1k2).
Since we only consider the incident state of k1 photons in mode a and k2 photons in mode
b, we shall simply use pαβij for p
αβ
ij (k1k2) in what follows.
i) in Z basis
First, we consider the following two-mode state
|k1〉H |k2〉V = 1√
k1!k2!
a†H
k1
b†V
k2|0〉 (11)
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as the input state of the beam-splitter. After BS, the output state |ψ〉 is
|ψ〉 =
(
1√
2
)k1+k2 1√
k1!k2!
(a†H + b
†
H)
k1(a†V − b†V )k2 |0〉 (12)
Therefore
〈l1l2|ρout|l1l2〉 = (1/2)k1+k2δk1l1δk2l2 (13)
According to Eq.(2), the conditional probability for event (1,2) is
pHV12 = P (12|ρout) =
∑
l1,l2
P (12|l1l2)(1/2)k1+k2δk1l1δk2l2 = (1/2)k1+k2P (12|k1k2) (14)
Similarly, we have
pHV34 = (1/2)
k1+k2P (34|k1k2)
pHV14 = (1/2)
k1+k2P (14|k1k2)
pHV23 = (1/2)
k1+k2P (23|k2k1)
(15)
Note that here P (ij|kmkn) is just P (ij|li = km, lj = kn) when l1 = k1 as defined by our
Definition 2 in previous section. For example, P (23|k2k1) is actually P (23|l2 = k2, l3 = k1).
Similarly, if the beam-splitter’s input state is |k1〉V |k2〉H , i.e. k1 vertical photons in mode a
and k2 horizontal photons in mode b, we have
pV H12 = (1/2)
k1+k2P (12|k2k1)
pV H34 = (1/2)
k1+k2P (34|k2k1)
pV H14 = (1/2)
k1+k2P (14|k2k1)
pV H23 = (1/2)
k1+k2P (23|k1k2)
(16)
Next we consider the following two-mode state
|k1〉H |k2〉H = 1√
k1!k2!
a†H
k1
b†H
k2|0〉 (17)
as the input state of the beam-splitter. After the beam-splitter, it changes into:
|ψ〉 =
(
1√
2
)k1+k2 1√
k1!k2!
(a†H + b
†
H)
k1(a†H − b†H)k2|0〉 (18)
We have the following uniform formula for probabilities of any successful events:
pHHij =


(k1+k2)!
k1!k2!
(1/2)k1+k2P (ij|k1 + k2, 0); for i = 1, j = 2; or i = 3, j = 4
(k1+k2)!
k1!k2!
(1/2)k1+k2P (ij|0, k1 + k2); for i = 1, j = 4; or i = 2, j = 3
(19)
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Similarly, when the beam-splitter’s input pulses are both vertical, we can find the value
for pV Vij .
ii) in X basis
We first consider the beam-splitter’s input state of |k1〉+|k2〉−, i.e., there are k1 photon
with pi/4 polarization in mode a and k2 photons with 3pi/4 polarization in mode b. Note
that |±〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 ± |V 〉). The output state of the beam-splitter is
|ψ〉 = 1
2k1+k2
√
k1!k2!
(a†H + a
†
V + b
†
H + b
†
V )
k1(a†H − a†V − b†H + b†V )k2 |0〉 (20)
We have
〈lilj |ψ〉 = 1
2k1+k2
√
k1!k2!
∆2∑
s=∆1
√
li!lj!C
s
k1
C l1−sk2 (−1)k2−li+sδli+l2,k1+k2 (21)
where
∆1 = min{li, k1}, ∆2 = li −min{li, k2} (22)
and min{li, k1(k2)} is the smaller one of li and k1(k2). Thus we can calculate the conditional
probabilities by
p+−ij =
k1+k2∑
li=0
|〈lilj|ψ〉|2
Hence
p+−ij =
1
4k1+k2k1!k2!
k1+k2∑
li=0
∣∣∣∣∣
∆1∑
s=∆2
√
l1!(k1 + k2 − li)!Csk1C li−sk2 (−1)li−s
∣∣∣∣∣
2
P (ij|li, k1+k2−li) (23)
for i = 1, j = 2 and i = 3, j = 4; and
p+−ij =
1
4k1+k2k1!k2!
k1+k2∑
li=0
∣∣∣∣∣
∆1∑
s=∆2
√
li!(k1 + k2 − l1)!Csk1C li−sk2
∣∣∣∣∣
2
P (ij|li, k1 + k2 − li) (24)
for i = 1, j = 4 and i = 2, j = 3. Besides, it is easy to show
p−+ij = p
+−
ij (25)
If the polarization of incident pulses of the beam-splitter are both pi/4, then the output state
is
|ψ〉 = 1
2k1+k2
√
k1!k2!
(a†H + a
†
V + b
†
H + b
†
V )
k1(a†H + a
†
V − b†H − b†V )k2|0〉. (26)
We find
p++ij =
1
4k1+k2k1!k2!
k1+k2∑
li=0
∣∣∣∣∣
∆1∑
s=∆2
√
l1!(k1 + k2 − li)!Csk1C li−sk2
∣∣∣∣∣
2
P (ij|li, k1 + k2 − li) (27)
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for i = 1, j = 2 and i = 3, j = 4; and
p++ij =
1
4k1+k2k1!k2!
k1+k2∑
li=0
∣∣∣∣∣
∆1∑
s=∆2
√
li!(k1 + k2 − l1)!Csk1C li−sk2 (−1)li−s
∣∣∣∣∣
2
P (ij|li, k1+k2−li) (28)
for i = 1, j = 4 and i = 2, j = 3. Also, we have
p−−ij = p
++
ij (29)
D. Probabilities of events conditional on source states
In the above subsection, we have formulated the probabilities of various events conditional
on a pure input state |k1〉|k2〉. In fact, the results can be easily extended to the more general
case when the beam-splitter’s input state is a mixed state. Say,(∑
k1
fk1 |k1〉〈k1
)
⊗
(∑
k2
fk2 |k2〉〈k2|
)
(30)
Suppose the polarizations of mode a, b are α, β, respectively. We then have
pαβij =
∑
k1,k2
fk1fk2p
αβ
ij (k1k2) (31)
where pαβij (k1k2) is the same as defined in the previous subsection, for all possible polariza-
tions (α, β) = (H, V ), (V,H), (H,H), (V, V ), (+,−), (−,+), (+,+), (−,−). To formulate the
probabilities conditional on any source states, we only need to relate the source state with
the beam-splitter’s input state. Suppose the source state in photon-number space is ρA⊗ρB
and
ρA =
∑
n an|n〉〈n|
ρB =
∑
n bn|n〉〈n|
(32)
After some loss channel, the state changes into the beam-splitter’s input state as Eq.(30).
Suppose the transmittance for the channel between Alice (Bob) and UTP is ηA (ηB). Using
the linear loss model of Eq. (3) we have
fk1 =
∑
n≥k1 anη
k1
A (1− ηA)n−k1Ck1n
fk2 =
∑
n≥k2 bnη
k2
B (1− ηB)n−k2Ck2n
(33)
We now arrive at our major conclusion:
10
Major conclusion: Formulas of pαβij (k1k2) in the earlier subsection together with Eqs.
(31,33) complete the model of probabilities of different events conditional on any source
states, i.e., the gains. Using Eqs. (8,9), one can also model the observed error rates of any
source states.
E. 3-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD
Using the Major conclusion above, we can model the gains and the error rates with a
3-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD method [22, 23]. We assume that Alice (Bob) has three
intensities in their source states, denoted as 0, µA, µ
′
A (0, µB, µ
′
B). Denote ρx (ρy) as the
density operator for source x (y) at Alice’s (Bob’s) side, and x (y) can take any value from
0, µA, µ
′
A (0, µB, µ
′
B).
ρ0 = |0〉〈0|; ρµA =
∑
k
ak|k〉〈k|; ρµ′
A
=
∑
k
a′k|k〉〈k|; ρµB =
∑
k
bk|k〉〈k|; ρµ′
B
=
∑
k
b′k|k〉〈k|
(34)
Then we have the expression for the low bound of the yield of single-photon pulse pairs
Y X11 ≥ Y X,L11 ≡
a′1b
′
2(S
X
µ,µ − S˜X0 )− a1b2(SXµ′,µ′ − S˜ ′X0 )
a′1a1(b
′
2b1 − b2b′1)
(35)
and their upper bound of the phase flip-error rate
eX11 6 e
X,U
11 ≡
EXµ,µS
X
µ,µ −EXµ,0SXµ,0 − EX0,µSX0,µ + EX0,0SX0,0
Y X11
(36)
With the results above, now we can calculate the key rate with the formula [19, 22, 23]
R ≥ a′1b′1Y Z11[1−H(eX11)]− SZµ′µ′f(EZµ′µ′)H(EZµ′µ′) (37)
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Using all the above correspondence, we can numerically simulate the gains and error
rates of any source states. Taking as an example, we consider the source of a HSPS from
parametric down-conversion processes [22]. It originally has a Poissonian photon number
distribution when pumped by a continuous wave (CW) laser [29], written as:
|ψ〉 = x
n
n!
e−x (38)
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where x is the the average intensity of the emission light. However, after chosen a proper gat-
ing time and triggered with a practical single photon detector, a sub-Poissonian distributed
source state can be obtained, which can be expressed as:
ρ = [PCordi + (1− PCor)e−x] |0〉 〈0|+
∞∑
n=1
[PCore−x x
n−1
(n−1)! + (1− PCor)e−x x
n
n!
] |n〉 〈n| (39)
where PCor is the correlation rate of photon pairs, i.e., the probability that we can predict
the existence of a heralded photon when a heralding one was detected; di is the dark count
rate of the triggering detector.
In the following numerical simulations, for simplicity, we assume the UTP lies in the
middle of Alice and Bob, and all triggering detectors (at Alice or Bob’s side) have the same
detection efficiency (75%) and the same dark count rate (10−6). We also assume all triggered
detectors (at the UTP’s side) have the same detection efficiency (they are attributed into
the channel loss), and the same dark count rate (3 × 10−6). Besides, we set the system
misalignment probability to be 1.5%.
Fig. 2(a) and (b) each show the low bound of Y11 (in X or Z basis) and the upper bound
of eX11 changing with channel loss for different source states, i.e., the weak coherent sources
(W), the possonian heralded single photon sources (P) and the sub-possonian heralded single
photon sources (S). The solid line represents the result of using infinite number of decoy state
method (W0), and the dashed or dotted lines (P1 or S1) are the results of using three-decoy
state method.
Similar to Fig. 2(a) and (b), Fig. 3(a) and (b) each show corresponding values of the
gains (SZµ′µ′) and the quantum bit-error rates (QBER) (E
Z
µ′µ′) of signal pulses in Z basis for
different source states. And Fig. 5 presents the final key rate changing with channel loss.
See from Fig. 4, we find that the sub-possonian heralded single photon sources can
generate the highest key rate at lower or moderate channel loss (6 64 dB). Because within
this range, its signal state has a lower QBER than in the weak coherent sources, and a
higher gain than in the possonian heralded single photon sources as simulated in Fig. 3 (a)
and (b). However, at larger channel loss (> 64 dB), the possonian heralded single photon
source shows better performance than the other two, this is mainly due to its much lower
vacuum component which may play an essential role in the key distillation process when
suffering from lager channel loss.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) (a) The lower bound of Y11 and (b) the upper bound of e
X
11 for different
photon sources. The solid lines (W0) represent the results of using infinite-decoy state method,
and the dashed or dotted lines (W1, P1 or S1) represent using three-decoy state method. Besides,
W, P or S each corresponds to the scheme of using weak coherent sources [19], possonian heralded
single photon sources [9] or sub-possonian heralded single photon sources [22], individually. X or Z
represent in X or Z basis respectively. Here at each point, we set µ = 0.05, and optimize the value
for µ′.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have presented a general model for simulating the gains, the error rates
and the key rates for MDI-QKDs, which can be applicable to the schemes of using arbitrary
convex source states and any coding methods. This facilitates the performance evaluation
13
FIG. 3: (Color online) (a) The gain and (b) the quantum error-bit rate in Z basis for different
photon sources. The solid lines (W0) represent the results of using infinite-decoy state method,
and the dashed or dotted lines (W1, P1 or S1) represent using three-decoy state method. Besides,
W, P or S each corresponds to the scheme of using weak coherent sources, possonian heralded
single photon sources [9] or sub-possonian heralded single photon sources [22], individually. Here
at each point, we set µ = 0.05, and optimize the value for µ′.
of any MDI-QKD methods, and thus make it a valuable tool for devising high efficient QKD
protocols and for studying long distance quantum communications.
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